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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
Proceedings deemed to be exclusively within the ambit of state
jurisdiction should not be interfered with by a federal injunction
premised solely on grounds not germane to the issues litigated. In-
stead, parties should be encouraged to exhaust state remedies before
availing themselves of the aid of a federal court. This decision, if
generally followed, would tend only to promote federal-state clashes
rather than implement the explicit policy of the anti-injunction
statute which is to avoid such conflict.
A
TAXATION - ESTATE TAXES - WHERE GRANTOR HAS PowER
TO ACCUMULATE TRUST INCOME SUCH INCOME IS TAXABLE TO His
ESTATE. - The grantor of a trust, as cotrustee, bad the power to dis-
tribute or accumulate trust income. The executors brought a refund
action after the Commissioner of Internal Revenue included in
grantor-decedent's gross estate both the original trust corpus and
the accumulated income arising from the principal. In reversing
the decision of the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, the
United States Supreme Court held that income accumulated pur-
suant to the exercise of the grantor's power, in addition to the
original transfer of trust property, constituted a taxable transfer
within the meaning of the Internal Revenue Code. United States
v. O'Malley, 383 U.S. 627 (1966).
Under the Internal Revenue Code of 1954' and its predecessor,2
a decedent's gross estate for estate tax purposes includes the value
of all property of which a transfer3 by trust or otherwise has been
made under any of the following circumstances: (1) the transfer
is in contemplation of death;4 (2) the transfer is subject to
certain retained5 life interests ;6 (3) the transfer is intended to
take effect in possession or enjoyment at or after the grantor's
IINT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §§2035(a), 2 036(a), 2037(a), 2038(a)(1),(2).
2Int. Rev. Code of 1939, §§ 811(c) (1), 811(d) (1).
3 Such a transfer does not include "a bona fide sale for an adequate and
full consideration in money or money's worth." INT. Rsv. CoDs OF 1954,
§ 2035(a), 2036(a), 2037(a), 2038(a) (1), (2).
4 It should be noted that a gift in contemplation of death, for Code
purposes, is not necessarily one arising from Ia reasonable fear that death is
near at hand. . . . It is sufficient if contemplation of death be the inducing
cause of the transfer whether or not death is believed to be near." United
States v. Wells, 283 U.S. 102, 109 (1930).
5 The retained power must be for the transferor's life "or for any period
not ascertainable without reference to his death br for any period which
does not in fact end before his death." INT. Rav. CODE OF 1954, § 2036(a).
6 The interests retained are either
(1) The possession or enjoyment of, or the right to the income
from, the property, or
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death; (4) the transfer is subject to reserved powers to alter,
amend, revoke or terminate. While the Internal Revenue Code
of 1954 and its predecessor include the value of the trust property
transferred in decedent's gross estate, they fail to specifically provide
for accumulated income subsequently generated by the transferred
property.
With respect to inter vivos transfers within the first category,
i.e., gifts in contemplation of death, any subsequent accumulated
income or property acquired by such accumulated income is not
part of the taxable transfer.7 In Burns v. Commissioners decided
by the fifth circuit in 1949, the grantor set up an irrevocable
trust in contemplation of death, naming as trustee an independent
trust company. In holding that the value of securities acquired
from income accumulations was not part of decedent's gross estate,
the court reasoned that, since the statute does not make provision
for the inclusion of accumulated income in the gross estate, it
should be strictly construed in favor of the taxpayer.
A similar result was reached in 1952 by the seventh circuit in
Commissioner v. Gidwitz" Estate.9 There the grantor set up a
trust in contemplation of death, naming himself and his spouse
as cotrustees. According to the trust instrument all income was
to be accumulated during the decedent's lifetime and distributed
upon his death. Although the grantor had designated himself a
trustee, the court held that the accumulated income generated by
(2) the right, either alone or in conjunction with any person, to
designate the persons who shall possess or enjoy the property or the
income therefrom. INT. REv. CoDE or 1954, § 2036(a) (1), (2).
7 Commissioner v. Gidwitz' Estate, 196 F.2d 813 (7th Cir. 1952); Burns
v. Commissioner, 177 F2d 739 (5th Cir. 1949). See also Estate of Delia
Crawford McGehee, 28 T.C. 412 (1957), wherein subsequent stock dividends
were held includible in decedent's gross estate after a transfer in contemplation
of death. The court stated that it made no difference whether the stock
dividends represented a capitalization of earnings or a stock split, for in either
case there was no change in the stockholders' interest in the corporation.
The stock was therefore transferred since the total amount of stock repre-
sented the same proportional interest originally transferred.
8 177 F.2d 739 (5th Cir. 1949). No distinction was made, with respect
to transfers in contemplation of death, between outright gifts and gifts in
trust. Previous cases have held that, while only the value of the specific
property transferred by outright gift was taxable in the gross estate, the
value of the entire trust corpus at date of death was taxable in the gross
estate when the transfer was by trust. See Pavenstedt, Taxation of Transfers
in Contemplation of Death: A Proposal for Abolition, 54 YALE L.J. 70,
87-88 (1944); MONTOmERY, FanmzA TAXES ON ESTATES, TRusTs & Grs
434-35 (1943). Compare Humphrey's Estate v. Commissioner, 162 F.2d 1
(5th Cir. 1947), wuith In re Kroger's Estate v. Commissioner, 145 F.2d
901, 907 (6th Cir. 1944), and Igleheart v. Commissioner, 77 F.2d 704, 711(5th Cir. 1935).
9 196 F.2d 813 (7th Cir. 1952).
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the trust corpus was not part of decedent's gross estate. It was
reasoned that the transfer was irrevocable and effective during the
grantor's life. Furthermore, the terms of the trust agreement
expressly prohibited any change in distribution, disposition, pos-
session or enjoyment of the trust property.
With respect to transactions in contemplation of death, Treas-
ury Department Regulations have indicated that any improvements,
additions and other enhancements in value made by the transferee
are not to be considered in ascertaining the value of the gross
estate.' The regulations have also made it explicit that income
received subsequent to the transfer in contemplation of death, and
property purchased with such income are to be excluded from the
computation of decedent's gross estate."
There is no comparable provision in the regulations with
respect to the taxability of accumulated income in decedent's gross
estate when the transaction qualifies under any of the other three
statutory transfers. Thus, case law on the taxability of accumulated
income has evolved without the aid of governmental guidelines
where the grantor retains a life interest, retains a power to alter,
amend, revoke or terminate, or establishes a trust not effective in
possession or enjoyment until death.
The United States Supreme Court stated in Maass v. Higgins2
that:
The promise to pay interest or rent, or the expectancy of dividends upon
stock, the amount of such payments, the past and prospective regularity of
the payments, and other elements bearing upon the expectation of the receipt
of income affect the value of any income producing property. But these
elements are not separately valued in appraising the worth of the asset at
any given time. It is the uniform practice to value the asset as an entirety,
taking into consideration all the elements that go to give it value in the
market. 3
The Court held in this case that, upon an election to value an
estate as of one year after death, income accrued and received
between the time of death and the time of such valuation should
not be included as part of the value of the gross estate. The
reasoning in Maass has lent support to the premise that accumulated
income is adequately reflected in the evaluation of the original
trust corpus without the separate measurement of the accumulated
income derived therefrom. 14 However, it has been held that income
10 Treas. Reg. § 20.2035-1(e) (1954).
1" Ibid.
12 312 U.S. 443 (1941).
'3 Maass v. Higgins, 312 U.S. 443, 448 (1941).
14 See, e.g., Michigan Trust Co. v. Kavanagh, 284 F.2d 502 (6th Cir.
1960).
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accumulated from trust property becomes taxable in the grantor's
estate when the transfer does not take effect in possession or
enjoyment until death,"5 or when the grantor retains the power
to designate the possession or enjoyment of such income.' 6
In 1955, the Court of Appeals of the Seventh Circuit held, in
Commissioner v. Estate of McDermott, that the grantor's reten-
tion of power to designate the persons who shall possess or enjoy
the transferred property or its income would not make the income
accumulations taxable in the settlor's gross estate. The decedent,
as trustee, was authorized to accumulate trust income which would
be added to corpus. The court, relying on Gidwitz and Burns,
ruled that the statute is only concerned with a transfer and since
the accumulations of income were not transferred by the grantor
to the trust, they did not form part of decedent's gross estate.
The court rejected the Commissioner's attempt to distinguish the
case from Gidwitz on the ground that the latter was concerned
with a transfer in contemplation of death and was therefore
complete during the grantor's lifetime. The court asserted that
the transfer in McDermott was complete since the trusts were
irrevocable and no power was reserved to revoke, change or
modify the terms of the trusts for the benefit of the grantor. Any
control over the distribution and accumulation of income "could
not result in any financial benefit to the trustee, and neither could
it affect the rights of the beneficiaries in the aggregate.""'
In 1963, the Tax Court refused to follow the doctrine of
McDermott. In Estate of Round,9 the grantor possessed both the
power to alter, amend, or revoke,"O and the power to designate
'5 Estate of Showers, 14 T.C. 902 (1950). The Tax Court held that
the accumulated income as well as the original trust corpus was taxable in
decedents gross estate since the enjoyment of the transfer was not effective
until death. The grantor had unrestricted power of sale or other disposition,
and could terminate the trust and deliver the trust estate to the beneficiaries.
It was reasoned that decedent's power to terminate and deliver the trust
estate also extended to the property acquired with trust income, and, therefore,
the tax was measured by the value of the trust estate at the time of death.
The same result was reached, but without discussion, in Estate of Spiegel v.
Commissioner, 335 U.S. 701 (1949), under § 811(c) (1) (C) of the 1939
Code.
26 Estate of Yawkey, 12 T.C. 1164 (1949). The statutory ground for
including the transfer was the retention of rights to designate the enjoyment
of the income derived from the trust corpus, based upon the grantor's
power to accumulate or distribute trust income at his discretion.
' 222 F.2d 665 (7th Cir. 1955).
i8 Commissioner v. Estate of McDermott, 222 F.2d 665, 668 (7th Cir.
1955).
1' 40 T.C. 970 (1963).20 Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 811(d), which is substantially re-enacted
as INT. REV. CoDE oF 1954, §2038(a). See Estate of Newberry, 17 T.C.
597 (1951), reVd on other grounds, 201 F.2d 874 (3d Cir. 1953) (decedent's
power to change the beneficiaries requires inclusion of trust corpus and
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the beneficiaries who were to possess the enjoyment of the prop-
erty or its income. Since these powers extended to the income
accumulations as well as the original corpus, the value of the
accumulations was held to be included in decedent's gross estate.
The court stated that its holding could be justified either on the
theory that the transfers were incomplete until the date of death;
or that the withholding of income from the beneficiaries, in itself,
constituted a transfer within the meaning of the statute.21 Estate
of Round was affirmed by the First Circuit Court of Appeals on
the theory of incomplete transfer,22 thus creating an apparent
conflict between circuits.
In the instant case, the Supreme Court resolved the conflict of
authority by holding that the grantor's discretionary power to
accumulate income, thereby denying to the beneficiaries the privilege
of immediate enjoyment, would make the accumulated income tax-
able as part of the grantor's estate under Section 811(c) (1) (B) (ii)
of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939.23 The grantor owned the right
to the present and future income produced by the property at the
time the trusts were established. Because of the retention of the
power to accumulate income, the Court reasoned that the subsequent
exercise of this power was an effective transfer within the meaning
of the Internal Revenue Code.
In resolving the controversy, McDermott was expressly over-
ruled as representing an erroneous extension of Gidwitz in which
only the original trust corpus was taxed as a gift in contemplation
of death. It was pointed out that in Gidwitz the taxable event
was a completed inter vivos transfer, while in the present case
the transfer was not completed until the grantor's death terminated
the reserved power to accumulate. A further distinction can be
drawn in that in Gidwitz the value of the original transferred
property was deemed an adequate estimate of any future income
rights since the grantor retained no interest in the property. In
the instant case the decedent retained the power to accumulate
accumulated income under §811(d)(2) of the Internal Revenue Code of
1939) ; Estate of Daniel Guggenheim, 40 B.T.A. 181, 182 (1939), modified
and aff'd, 117 F.2d 469 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 621 (1941)
(decedent's power "'to alter define and prescribe the relative interests of
the beneficiaries . . .'" was equated to the power of revocation and required
inclusion of accumulated income under the Revenue Act of 1926. Id. at
182-83). The same result was reached, but without discussion, in Commis-
sioner v. Estate of Holmes, 326 U.S. 480 (1945), under § 811(d) (2).
21 See, however, Michigan Trust Co. v. Kavanagh, 284 F.2d 502 (6th Cir.
1960), where the court, relying upon the decision in McDermott, held that
the accumulated trust income was not includible in the decedent's gross estate,
though the grantor reserved the right within the statutory provision to alter,
amend or revoke the trust.
22 Round v. Commissioner, 332 F.2d 590 (1st Cir. 1964).
23 United States v. O'Malley, 383 U.S. 627 (1966).
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income until the moment of his death and the corpus additions
produced by the exercise of this power were properly included in
the grantor's gross estate.
Mr. Justice Stewart, dissenting, literally interpreted the statute
as applying only to property "of which the decedent has at any
time made a transfer."'24 Here, the grantor never made an actual
transfer of the subsequent accumulated income. Consequently,
he was of the opinion that this accumulated income was sufficiently
reflected as income-producing capacity in the valuation of the
original trust corpus.
United States v. O'Malley has eliminated the confusion result-
ing from conflicting case law. The Court, interpreting the code
in a situation where the grantor retained an accumulative power,
has apparently made a sound policy decision. Since it is this
accumulative power which makes the trust corpus initially includ-
ible in the decedent's gross estate, it follows logically that this same
power should also make any income increment derived therefrom
part of the estate. However, where such trusts have existed for
long periods the accumulated income may substantially increase
estate taxes. To avoid the increased estate tax burdens, grantors
of such trusts must either relinquish their retained powers in
favor of an independent trustee or distribute the past accumulated
and present income to the beneficiaries who would then be taxed
under the income tax provisions of the code.25 The instant case
will make it more difficult for estate planners to provide for the
payment of estate taxes since provision must be made not only
for fluctuations in market value, but also for the investment skill
of the trustee.
Left unanswered is the question of the exact extent of the
applicability of this decision. The Court does not discuss the
includibility of accumulated income under Section 2038 of the
Internal Revenue Code of 1954 relating to transfers where the
grantor retains the power to alter, amend, revoke, or terminate
the trust. Where in such trusts the accumulations are not made
as a result of the grantor's discretion, the withholding of income
cannot be described as a new transfer by the grantor to the trust.
However, such accumulated income can be taxed on the theory
that the grantor's retention of power makes the original transfer
incomplete, and such reserved power applies to the accumulated
income as well as the trust corpus. 6
The Court distinguished the instant case from Gidwitz and
Burns which held that in a transfer in contemplation of death the
24 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 2036(a).
25 See INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 662, 666.
26 See Estate of Round, 40 T.C. 970 (1963), aff'd sub nor., Round v.
Commissioner, 332 F2d 590 (1st Cir. 1964).
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subsequent accumulated income is not included within decedent's
gross estate. Nevertheless, there seems little doubt that, when
the grantor makes a transfer in contemplation of death but retains
the right to accumulate income, the accumulated income would be
included in decedent's gross estate. In such a situation the transfer
in contemplation of death would be incomplete as a result of the
grantor's reservation of power. Under Section 2038(a) of the
1954 Code, the grantor's relinquishment in contemplation of death
of a power to alter, amend, revoke, or terminate will make the
transfer includible in decedent's gross estate. The subsequent
accumulated income, however, should not be included since the
transaction completely divested the grantor of all rights in the
property.
The most logical theory for including accumulated income is
the incompleteness of the transfer. This theory can be applied
to both the retained power to designate the enjoyment of the
trust and to the power to alter, amend, revoke, or terminate the
trust. Although United States v. O'Malley finds support in both
the incomplete and new transfer theories, it employs the incom-
plete aspect to justify the difference between gifts in contemplation
of death and transfers reserving the power to accumulate income.
While a transfer in contemplation of death may be complete in all
respects, a transfer with the grantor retaining power to accumulate
income is not a complete transfer of all the grantor's property
rights. 27
27 See Commissioner v. Gidwitz' Estate, supra note 7.
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